Epistemically robust strategy subsets
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Publication:725063
DOI10.3390/g7040037zbMath1407.91059OpenAlexW2551860995MaRDI QIDQ725063
Geir B. Asheim, Mark Voorneveld, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040037
rationalizabilityepistemic game theoryclosedness under rational behaviorepistemic robustnessmutual \(p\)-belief
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Cites Work
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