Epistemically robust strategy subsets

DOI10.3390/G7040037zbMATH Open1407.91059OpenAlexW2551860995MaRDI QIDQ725063FDOQ725063

Geir B. Asheim, Jörgen W. Weibull, Mark Voorneveld

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040037

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zbMATH Keywords

epistemic game theoryrationalizabilityclosedness under rational behaviorepistemic robustnessmutual \(p\)-belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited In (4)

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• The implications of finite‐order reasoning
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction

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