A hidden Markov model for the detection of pure and mixed strategy play in games

DOI10.1017/S026646661400053XMaRDI QIDQ3450345zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. Todd Swarthout, Lijia Wei, Jason Shachat

Publication date 3 November 2015

Published in Econometric Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s026646661400053x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Markov processes: estimation; hidden Markov models (62M05) Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
• Hide and seek in Arizona
• Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
• Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis
• Non-cooperative games
• Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
• On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples
• Professionals Play Minimax

Cited in

(3)

• Using HMM in strategic games
• Cognitive load and mixed strategies: on brains and minimax
• Learning in unprofitable games

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