Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00163-3MaRDI QIDQ1274643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William H. Sandholm

Publication date 12 January 1999

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00163-3

zbMATH Keywords

learningdecision rulesMarkov chainsevolutionmutationsNash equilibriumequilibrium selectionlong run equilibriarisk dominant equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Decision theory for games (91A35) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Recommendations

• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model

Cites work

• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(26)

• Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
• Contagion and efficiency
• Constrained interactions and social coordination
• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
• Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
• Robust stochastic stability
• Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
• Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
• Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
• Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
• BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
• Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
• Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints
• Evolutionary game theory
• Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise
• When are efficient conventions selected in networks?
• Imitation with asymmetric memory
• Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The logit-response dynamics
• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
• Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
• An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules

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