Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00163-3MaRDI QIDQ1274643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William H. Sandholm

Publication date 12 January 1999

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00163-3

zbMATH Keywords

decision rulesequilibrium selectionevolutionlearninglong run equilibriaMarkov chainsmutationsNash equilibriumrisk dominant equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Recommendations

• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model

Cites work

• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(28)

• An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules
• Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
• Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
• Learning, bounded memory, and inertia
• Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run
• Tributes to Bill Sandholm
• When are efficient conventions selected in networks?
• Robust stochastic stability
• The logit-response dynamics
• Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
• Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise
• Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
• BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
• Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching
• Constrained interactions and social coordination
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
• Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
• Evolutionary game theory
• Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints
• Imitation with asymmetric memory
• Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power
• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
• Information paths and learning in games: experimental evidence
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
• Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
• Contagion and efficiency

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