Remarks on Nash equilibria for games with additively coupled payoffs
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Publication:2365075
DOI10.1007/BF01213450zbMATH Open0876.90093MaRDI QIDQ2365075FDOQ2365075
Authors: Erik J. Balder 
Publication date: 4 February 1997
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
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- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs
- New Existence Results for Optimal Controls in the Absence of Convexity: The Importance of Extremality
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- Existence of Saddle Points and Nash Equilibrium Points for Differential Games
- Remarks on Weak Compactness in L1(μ,X)
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Cited In (8)
- When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
- An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey
- Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
- Learning payoff functions in infinite games
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions
- Existence of social equilibria in generalized Nash games with additively coupled payoffs
- Correction to: ``Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions
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