Networks and stability
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Cites work
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Cited in
(21)- Farsightedly stable networks
- Complex interactions in large government networks
- Quantity strategies in economic networks
- Nonspecific networking
- Stable and emergent network topologies: a structural approach
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Complexity and stochastic evolution of dyadic networks
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