Games of social interactions with local and global externalities

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.012zbMath1211.91077OpenAlexW1975791740MaRDI QIDQ533945

Shlomo Weber, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15318/1/LeBreton_15318.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

potential functionconformityexternalitiessocial interactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (8)

The structure of utility functions ensuring the existence of an exact potential in a strategic game ⋮ A universal construction generating potential games ⋮ Gale-Nikaido-Debreu and Milgrom-Shannon: communal interactions with endogenous community structures ⋮ Externality effects in the formation of societies ⋮ Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities ⋮ Computation of Cournot-Nash equilibria by entropic regularization ⋮ Optimal Transport and Cournot-Nash Equilibria ⋮ EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR A SPATIAL MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS*

Cites Work

• Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
• Potential games
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Congestion games revisited
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
• A graph‐theoretic definition of a sociometric clique†
• Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models

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