On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
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Publication:372955
DOI10.1007/S00224-012-9433-0zbMATH Open1282.91025OpenAlexW2034471979MaRDI QIDQ372955FDOQ372955
Authors: Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik 
Publication date: 21 October 2013
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9433-0
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computational complexityNash equilibriumPareto optimalitynoncooperative gamescongestion gamesstrong equilibrium
Cites Work
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- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
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- Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games
- Anonymous games with binary actions
- Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
- Strong equilibrium in congestion games
- Characterization of pure strategy equilibria infinite anonymous games
- On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
- On the complexity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games
- Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
Cited In (8)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Pareto efficiency and approximate Pareto efficiency in routing and load balancing games
- On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria
- On oblivious PTAS's for nash equilibrium
- Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
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- On the existence of strong Nash equilibria
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