On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
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Publication:372955
DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9433-0zbMath1282.91025OpenAlexW2034471979MaRDI QIDQ372955
Alexander Skopalik, Martin Hoefer
Publication date: 21 October 2013
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9433-0
computational complexityNash equilibriumPareto optimalitynoncooperative gamescongestion gamesstrong equilibrium
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Cites Work
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