On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria

DOI10.1007/S00224-012-9433-0MaRDI QIDQ372955zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik

Publication date 21 October 2013

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9433-0

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityNash equilibriumPareto optimalitynoncooperative gamescongestion gamesstrong equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
• Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
• Atomic congestion games among coalitions
• Pareto efficiency and approximate Pareto efficiency in routing and load balancing games
• Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243403 (Why is no real title available?)
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Anonymous games with binary actions
• Characterization of pure strategy equilibria infinite anonymous games
• Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
• Microeconomic theory
• On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
• On the complexity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games
• On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
• Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
• Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Strong price of anarchy
• Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria

Cited in

(8)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5942357 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pareto efficiency and approximate Pareto efficiency in routing and load balancing games
• On the structure and complexity of worst-case equilibria
• On oblivious PTAS's for nash equilibrium
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
• On the existence of strong Nash equilibria

This page was built for publication: On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q372955)