On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria (Q372955)
From MaRDI portal
 | This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use this page instead for the normal view: On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6217429
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| default for all languages | No label defined |
||
| English | On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6217429 |
Statements
On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria (English)
0 references
21 October 2013
0 references
The authors consider computational complexity of strong and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria in some classes of noncooperative games. First they show that a recognition task is polynomial for anonymous games, but the existence is NP-hard. The algorithm is based on a perfect matching scheme. It is shown that the recognition and computation task are polynomial for the special class of player-specific singleton congestion games, but existence and recognition are NP-hard in general congestion games.
0 references
noncooperative games
0 references
Nash equilibrium
0 references
strong equilibrium
0 references
Pareto optimality
0 references
computational complexity
0 references
congestion games
0 references
0 references
1.0000001192092896
0 references
0.8299184441566467
0 references
0.819433331489563
0 references
0.8192323446273804
0 references
0.8192087411880493
0 references
