Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottleneck Congestion Games
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Publication:3586381
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_3zbMATH Open1287.91004OpenAlexW2142663383MaRDI QIDQ3586381FDOQ3586381
Authors: Tobias Harks, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, Alexander Skopalik 
Publication date: 6 September 2010
Published in: Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/computing-pure-nash-and-strong-equilibria-in-bottleneck-congestion-games(4067cc21-1b71-4a03-ac6d-f5687c55579c).html
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Cited In (14)
- Computation and efficiency of potential function minimizers of combinatorial congestion games
- Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
- Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games
- Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
- Computing pure Nash equilibria in network revenue management games
- The strong price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games
- Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
- Equilibria in bottleneck games
- On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
- On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
- Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property
- Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
- Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
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