Collusion and customization

DOI10.1142/S0219198920500073MaRDI QIDQ5013374zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors

Publication date 30 November 2021

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500073

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncustomizationSalop model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Standardization and the stability of collusion
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Tacit collusion with consumer preference costs
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

Cited in

(3)

• Customization competition between branded firms: continuous extension of product line from core product
• Tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocity
• Product-line competition: customization vs. proliferation

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