Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1363zbMATH Open1170.91424OpenAlexW1968689576MaRDI QIDQ3398205FDOQ3398205

Authors: Gorkem Celik 

Publication date: 26 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1363

Recommendations

• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Stopping agents from ``cheating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (2)

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

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