CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves
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Cites work
Cited in
(6)- Managerial overconfidence in initial public offering decisions and its impact on macrodynamics and financial stability: analysis using an agent-based model
- CEO overconfidence and innovation
- Worker overconfidence: Field evidence and implications for employee turnover and firm profits
- Multimarket Competition and Earnings Quality: Evidence from the Insurance Industry
- Investment and reinsurance with incomplete information and biased beliefs
- Enterprise Risk Management, External Financing, and Corporate Investment
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