Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
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Publication:2765518
DOI10.1162/00335530152466269zbMath0989.91057OpenAlexW2068658192WikidataQ56484924 ScholiaQ56484924MaRDI QIDQ2765518
Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan
Publication date: 16 June 2002
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269
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