Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9335-2MaRDI QIDQ2015024zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mathieu Lefebvre, Ferdinand M. Vieider

Publication date 18 June 2014

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/130578

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesrisk-takingaccountabilityexecutive compensationstock options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decision theory (91B06) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Recommendations

• Executive compensation and risk taking
• How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
• Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry
• On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
• The ecology of risk taking

Cites work

• A new solution for a partially penetrating constant-rate pumping well with a finite-thickness skin
• A tractable method to measure utility and loss aversion under prospect theory
• Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are
• What is loss aversion?

Cited in

(6)

• Losing funds or losing face? Reputation and accountability in the credit rating industry
• Good decision vs. good results: outcome bias in the evaluation of financial agents
• Synthetic unlimited liability
• It's about how the task is set: the inclusion-exclusion effect and accountability in preprocessing management information
• Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry
• Executive compensation and risk taking

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE

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