Executive compensation and risk taking

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFU049MaRDI QIDQ4554753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 9 November 2018

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60846

zbMATH Keywords

credit default swapsexecutive compensationrisk taking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20) Credit risk (91G40) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Recommendations

• How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
• Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry
• Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability
• On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
• Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes

Cited in

(11)

• Nonstationary Z-score measures
• Crisis contracts
• Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
• Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability
• Asset holdings, information aggregation in secondary markets and credit cycles
• How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
• Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
• On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
• Revenge of the steamroller: ABCP as a window on risk choices
• Synthetic unlimited liability
• Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry

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