Losing funds or losing face? Reputation and accountability in the credit rating industry
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Publication:2098016
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Incentives and cheating
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- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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