Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters

DOI10.1287/DECA.1120.0233zbMath1398.91020OpenAlexW2124363982MaRDI QIDQ4691962

May Cheung, Jun Zhuang

Publication date: 24 October 2018

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e13ff798b1963e823bd830ef52a607ad8c59d0d8

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryregulationriskdisasteroil spillcoal miningairline industrynuclear powerpure and mixed strategiescompetition between companies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (6)

The strategic interaction between a company and the government surrounding disasters ⋮ Static and dynamic resource allocation models for recovery of interdependent systems: application to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill ⋮ Modeling Public–Private Partnerships in Disaster Management via Centralized and Decentralized Models ⋮ Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners ⋮ Interplay of rumor propagation and clarification on social media during crisis events -- a game-theoretic approach ⋮ Joint pricing and purchasing decisions for the dual-channel newsvendor model with partial information

Cites Work

• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game

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