A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline

DOI10.1007/S00291-015-0421-ZMaRDI QIDQ280172zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dennis De Clerck, Erik Demeulemeester

Publication date 4 May 2016

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/510484

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriumbest response heuristicpublic-private partnershipssequential procurement auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

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• Stochastic Games
• The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions

Cited in

(2)

• Editorial ``Project management and scheduling
• Concept and prototype of a web tool for public-private project contracting based on a system dynamics model

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