Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009zbMath1409.91124arXiv1408.0703OpenAlexW2591852222WikidataQ60521606 ScholiaQ60521606MaRDI QIDQ523528

David R. M. Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.0703

zbMATH Keywords

sponsored searchcompact game representationscomputational mechanism analysisposition auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items (5)

Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction ⋮ Action-graph games ⋮ Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions ⋮ Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction ⋮ Pure Nash Equilibria in Resource Graph Games

Uses Software

• Gambit

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
• Action-graph games
• Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium
• Simultaneous statistical inference. 2nd ed
• A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Simplicial Variable Dimension Algorithms for Solving the Nonlinear Complementarity Problem on a Product of Unit Simplices Using a General Labelling

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