Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009zbMath1409.91124arXiv1408.0703WikidataQ60521606 ScholiaQ60521606MaRDI QIDQ523528

David R. M. Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1408.0703

zbMATH Keywords

sponsored search; compact game representations; computational mechanism analysis; position auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A43: Games involving graphs

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91-08: Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

90B60: Marketing, advertising

91-04: Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

Related Items

Pure Nash Equilibria in Resource Graph Games, Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions, Action-graph games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction, Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction

Uses Software

• Gambit

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
• Action-graph games
• Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium
• Simultaneous statistical inference. 2nd ed
• A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Simplicial Variable Dimension Algorithms for Solving the Nonlinear Complementarity Problem on a Product of Unit Simplices Using a General Labelling