Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2012.09.007zbMath1270.91009DBLPjournals/ai/RabinovichNGJ13OpenAlexW2155779146WikidataQ58683158 ScholiaQ58683158MaRDI QIDQ360104

Zinovi Rabinovich, Enrico H. Gerding, Nicholas R. Jennings, Victor Naroditskiy

Publication date: 26 August 2013

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/343596/1/documentnew.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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