Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2012.09.007MaRDI QIDQ360104zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Zinovi Rabinovich, Victor Naroditskiy, E. H. Gerding, Nicholas R. Jennings

Publication date 26 August 2013

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/343596/1/documentnew.pdf, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370212001191

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cited in

(16)

• Algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibrium in continuous games with application to continuous blotto
• Bayes--Nash equilibrium: infinite-depth point information structures
• Existence and approximation of continuous Bayesian Nash equilibria in games with continuous type and action spaces
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
• Learning Equilibria in Asymmetric Auction Games
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities
• Solving for Best Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods
• Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent incomplete-information aggregative games
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
• Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions
• Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces
• Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
• The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria

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