Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2012.09.007zbMATH Open1270.91009DBLPjournals/ai/RabinovichNGJ13OpenAlexW2155779146WikidataQ58683158 ScholiaQ58683158MaRDI QIDQ360104FDOQ360104

Authors: Zinovi Rabinovich, Victor Naroditskiy, E. H. Gerding, Nicholas R. Jennings 

Publication date: 26 August 2013

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/343596/1/documentnew.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cited In (14)

• Bayesian Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent incomplete-information aggregative games
• Purification of Bayesian-Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces
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• Algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibrium in continuous games with application to continuous blotto
• Existence and approximation of continuous Bayesian Nash equilibria in games with continuous type and action spaces
• Solving for Best Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods
• On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
• Bayes--Nash equilibrium: infinite-depth point information structures
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium and variational inequalities
• The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria
• Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
• Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions

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