Learning Equilibria in Asymmetric Auction Games

DOI10.1287/IJOC.2023.1281MaRDI QIDQ6203500zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Bichler, Nils Kohring

Publication date 28 February 2024

Published in INFORMS Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2023.1281

zbMATH Keywords

Bayes-Nash equilibriaequilibrium learningneural networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical programming (90Cxx)

Recommendations

• Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types
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• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions

Cited in

(2)

• Optimal auctions through deep learning: advances in differentiable economics
• Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives

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