A game theoretic model for resource allocation among countermeasures with multiple attributes
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Publication:322944
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.01.026zbMath1346.91114OpenAlexW2281890680MaRDI QIDQ322944
Igor Linkov, Elisabeth Paulson, Jeffrey M. Keisler
Publication date: 7 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.01.026
2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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