Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption

DOI10.1007/S10479-013-1431-3MaRDI QIDQ2449366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Abhra Roy, Jomon Aliyas Paul

Publication date 8 May 2014

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1431-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Recommendations

• A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism
• Strategic deterrence of terrorist attacks
• Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists
• Active and passive defense against multiple attack facilities
• The UN in the lab

Cites work

• A bilevel mixed-integer program for critical infrastructure protection planning
• Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
• Contest success functions
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
• Interdependent security
• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks

Cited in

(11)

• Strategic deterrence of terrorist attacks
• Optimization method in counter terrorism: min-max zero-sum differential game approach
• Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
• A study on Nash-collative differential game of \(N\)-players for counterterrorism
• The development of a differential game related to terrorism: MIN-MAX differential game
• Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists
• A terrorism-based differential game: Nash differential game
• Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression
• The UN in the lab
• Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
• A differential game related to terrorism: Stackelberg differential game of E-differentiable and E-convex function

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