Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.01.006zbMATH Open1393.91025OpenAlexW2581684512MaRDI QIDQ2013341FDOQ2013341
Authors: Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman, Richard J. Zeckhauser
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.006
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Cites Work
Cited In (5)
- Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
- A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS
- Deterrence games and the disruption of information
- Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
- Monitoring innovation
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