Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
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Cites work
Cited in
(5)- Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
- A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS
- Deterrence games and the disruption of information
- Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
- Monitoring innovation
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