Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.006zbMATH Open1521.91009OpenAlexW4384742988MaRDI QIDQ6176751FDOQ6176751

Authors: Siyu Ma, Dov Biran 

Publication date: 23 August 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.006

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zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriumintelligence systemnuclear deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction

Cited In (2)

• Deterrence games and the disruption of information
• Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction

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