Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.006zbMath1521.91009OpenAlexW4384742988MaRDI QIDQ6176751

Dov Biran, Siyu Ma

Publication date: 23 August 2023

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriumintelligence systemnuclear deterrence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Deterrence games and the disruption of information

Cites Work

• Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
• Unnamed Item

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