A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000953zbMATH Open1197.91059MaRDI QIDQ3421628FDOQ3421628

Authors: Guillermo Owen, Gordon H. McCormick 

Publication date: 7 February 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorydeterrencecounter-proliferation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Other social and behavioral sciences (mathematical treatment) (91F99)

Cited In (6)

• Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
• The cooperative ballistic missile defence game
• North Korea nuclear crisis; policies and strategies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Threats
• Iterated games and arms race models

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