Deterrence games and the disruption of information

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00870-3MaRDI QIDQ6146795zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Siyu Ma, Yair Tauman, Richard J. Zeckhauser

Publication date 31 January 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00870-3

zbMATH Keywords

deterrenceinformation disruptionintelligencenoise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
• Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(1)

• Cyber deterrence with imperfect attribution and unverifiable signaling

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