Optimal Threats

DOI10.1287/OPRE.35.4.524MaRDI QIDQ3775356zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

Publication date 1987

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.35.4.524

zbMATH Keywords

ChickenDeterrence EquilibriumNash equilibriaThreat Gamethreat of retaliationtit-for-tat

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cited in

(8)

• Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression
• The hybridisation of conflict: a prospect theoretic analysis
• Agreement through threats: The Northern Ireland case
• A GAME MODEL OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION, WITH MULTIPLE ENTRANTS
• Is Deterrence Evolutionarily Stable?
• Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
• A misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality
• Deterrence games and the disruption of information

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