Is Deterrence Evolutionarily Stable?

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_18MaRDI QIDQ3646719zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Ellison, Michel Rudnianski

Publication date 27 November 2009

Published in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_18

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic stabilitydeterrenceevolutionary stabilityplayabilityplayability dynamicspositive playabilitystability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

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Cites work

• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5543872 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759749 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(1)

• A misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality

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