Entry and espionage with noisy signals

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.005MaRDI QIDQ2437171zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2013/0113.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

entryasymmetric informationsignal-jammingespionage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
• Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?
• Games with espionage
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099357 (Why is no real title available?)
• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Duopoly signal jamming
• Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation
• Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing
• First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
• Games with espionage
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Information leakage forces cooperation
• Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model

Cited in

(7)

• Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
• Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
• Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing
• The implications of pricing on social learning
• Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
• Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion
• Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

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