Entry and espionage with noisy signals

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.005zbMath1284.91290MaRDI QIDQ2437171

Amparo Urbano, Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2013/0113.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric information; entry; signal-jamming; espionage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

The implications of pricing on social learning, Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment, Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects, Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?

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