Entry and espionage with noisy signals
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Publication:2437171
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.005zbMATH Open1284.91290OpenAlexW2109603178MaRDI QIDQ2437171FDOQ2437171
Authors: Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano 
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2013/0113.pdf
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Cites Work
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
- Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
- Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
- First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
- Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation
- Information leakage forces cooperation
- Duopoly signal jamming
- Limit Pricing when the Potential Entrant is Uncertain of its Cost Function
- Games with espionage
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing
Cited In (7)
- Attacking a nuclear facility: the impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
- Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
- Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing
- The implications of pricing on social learning
- Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
- Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion
- Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?
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