Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion
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Publication:6088197
DOI10.1007/S40505-023-00257-3zbMath1530.91219MaRDI QIDQ6088197
Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Cuihong Fan
Publication date: 13 December 2023
Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
- Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
- Commitment in first-price auctions
- Games with espionage
- Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
- Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information: who benefits and is it stable?
- Entry and espionage with noisy signals
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
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