Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1219zbMath1169.91351OpenAlexW2122610487MaRDI QIDQ3394929

Martin K. Perry, Roberto Burguet

Publication date: 11 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1827.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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