Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence

DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9176-YMaRDI QIDQ2463422zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rachel O. Hess, Charles A. Holt, Angela M. Smith

Publication date 6 December 2007

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9176-y

zbMATH Keywords

Coordination gamesLaboratory experimentsPotential gamesSecurity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design
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• Defense and security planning under resource uncertainty and multi‐period commitments

Cites work

• Interdependent security
• Potential games

Cited in

(3)

• Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: the impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction
• Investing in prevention or paying for recovery -- attitudes to cyber risk
• The UN in the lab

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