Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist

DOI10.1504/IJOR.2011.037265zbMATH Open1207.91019MaRDI QIDQ631965FDOQ631965

Authors: Oded Berman, Arieh Gavious, Rongbing Huang 

Publication date: 14 March 2011

Published in: International Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryfacilities locationsimultaneous gamesterrorists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) 2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (8)

• Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
• Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?
• Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence
• Incorporating the threat of terrorist attacks in the design of public service facility networks
• On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: first-mover advantage vs. robustness
• Optimal sensor deployment to increase the security of the maximal breach path in border surveillance
• A game‐theoretic approach for the location of terror response facilities with both disruption risk and hidden information
• Intertemporal versus spatial externalities in counterterror policy games

Uses Software

• Gambit

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