Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist

DOI10.1504/IJOR.2011.037265MaRDI QIDQ631965zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Oded Berman, Arieh Gavious, Rongbing Huang

Publication date 14 March 2011

Published in International Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryfacilities locationsimultaneous gamesterrorists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) 2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cited in

(8)

• Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
• Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?
• Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence
• Incorporating the threat of terrorist attacks in the design of public service facility networks
• On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: first-mover advantage vs. robustness
• Optimal sensor deployment to increase the security of the maximal breach path in border surveillance
• A game‐theoretic approach for the location of terror response facilities with both disruption risk and hidden information
• Intertemporal versus spatial externalities in counterterror policy games

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Gambit

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