A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism
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Publication:625035
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.06.010zbMATH Open1205.91029OpenAlexW2091625349MaRDI QIDQ625035FDOQ625035
Authors: Eva Cárceles-Poveda, Yair Tauman 
Publication date: 11 February 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.010
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Cites Work
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- Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
- Information security investment when hackers disseminate knowledge
- Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: coordination and a strategic attacker
- The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security
- Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages
- Cooperative game theory and terrorist networks
- Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R\&D, defense and pre-emption
- Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war
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