A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.06.010zbMATH Open1205.91029OpenAlexW2091625349MaRDI QIDQ625035FDOQ625035

Eva Cárceles-Poveda, Yair Tauman

Publication date: 11 February 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.010

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zbMATH Keywords

conflict resolutionproactive and defensive measuresstrategic interactionstransnational terrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow

Cited In (8)

• Self-enforcing collective counterterror retaliation
• Interdependent defense games with applications to internet security at the level of autonomous systems
• Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures
• Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: coordination and a strategic attacker
• Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages
• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game
• Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge
• Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war

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