The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security

DOI10.3390/G11020024MaRDI QIDQ2221271zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas J. Novak, Aniruddha Bagchi, Timothy Mathews, João Ricardo Faria

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020024

zbMATH Keywords

differential gameexternalitiesinternational public goodsrefugee crisisterrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Public goods (91B18)

Review text

Summary: This paper studies a three player hierarchical differential game (with a large country, a small country, and a terrorist organization), to analyze the actual European refugee situation. Terrorists may enter Europe as refugees, taking advantage of the Open Door Policy, to attack both countries. There are two scenarios: myopia and full awareness. Countries are myopic when they ignore each other's security efforts, and the terrorist group only considers the weakest link's security efforts. A comparison between the scenarios shows that for an extremely impatient large country, full awareness yields a greater level of security effort for the large country, a greater level of security effort for the small country, and more terrorist attacks. This is, however, an unstable equilibrium. The full awareness model with a patient large country is stable and lies in between the previous model and the myopic model. Although it yields larger investments in security, this still results in more terrorist attacks than the myopic model. Continental safety is higher in the myopic model than in the full awareness model.

Recommendations

• A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism
• Differential terror queue games
• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
• A Stackelberg differential game for defence and economy
• Intertemporal versus spatial externalities in counterterror policy games

Cites work

• A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
• A dynamical model of terrorism
• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6938741 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
• Optimizing counter-terror operations: should one fight fire with ``fire or ``water?
• Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution
• Terror Cycles
• Terror queues
• Terrorism control in the tourism industry
• Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests: the case of telephony

Cited in

(1)

• The path of terror attacks

This page was built for publication: The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2221271)