The refugee game: the relationship between individual security expenditures and collective security

DOI10.3390/G11020024zbMath1457.91083OpenAlexW3034168016MaRDI QIDQ2221271

Aniruddha Bagchi, Andreas J. Novak, Timothy Mathews, João Ricardo Faria

Publication date: 26 January 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020024

zbMATH Keywords

differential gameexternalitiesterrorisminternational public goodsrefugee crisis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (1)

The path of terror attacks

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• A dynamical model of terrorism
• A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
• Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution
• Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests: the case of telephony
• Optimizing counter-terror operations: should one fight fire with ``fire or ``water?
• Terror Queues
• Terror Cycles
• Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism
• Terrorism control in the tourism industry

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