Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations
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Publication:1997670
Recommendations
- Governments playing games and combating the dynamics of a terrorist organization
- A dynamical model of terrorism
- Terrorists' eradication versus perpetual terror war
- A terrorism-based differential game: Nash differential game
- Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution
Cites work
- A bistable belief dynamics model for radicalization within sectarian conflict
- A dynamical model of terrorism
- Defending against multiple different attackers
- Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
- Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
- Lanchester model for three-way combat
- Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
- Multithreat multisite protection: a security case study
- Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
- Optimizing counter-terror operations: should one fight fire with ``fire or ``water?
- Stochastic conditional and unconditional warfare
- Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution
- The development and interaction of terrorist and fanatic groups
- Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow
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