Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2005.12.022zbMATH Open1110.90063OpenAlexW2059829651MaRDI QIDQ856300FDOQ856300

Authors: Arieh Gavious, Oded Berman 

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.12.022

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorylocationterror

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

Cites Work

• Analyzing bioterror; response logistics: The case of smallpox.
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (21)

• A review of attacker-defender games: current state and paths forward
• Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game
• Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations
• A new epidemics-logistics model: insights into controlling the Ebola virus disease in West Africa
• Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?
• Designing response supply chain against bioattacks
• Supply location and transportation planning for hurricanes: a two-stage stochastic programming framework
• Governments playing games and combating the dynamics of a terrorist organization
• Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
• Incorporating the threat of terrorist attacks in the design of public service facility networks
• Sequential competitive location on networks
• Robust equilibria in location games
• Maintaining effective logistics management during and after COVID-19 pandemic: survey on the importance of artificial intelligence to enhance recovery strategies
• Optimal sensor deployment to increase the security of the maximal breach path in border surveillance
• Modeling the logistics response to a bioterrorist anthrax attack
• Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
• Optimal response against bioterror attack on airport terminal
• Security protection design for deception and real system regimes: a model and analysis
• The path of terror attacks
• Location-allocation planning of stockpiles for effective disaster mitigation
• A game‐theoretic approach for the location of terror response facilities with both disruption risk and hidden information

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