Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
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Publication:856300
Recommendations
- Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
- Active and passive defense against multiple attack facilities
- A bilevel fixed charge location model for facilities under imminent attack
- Differential terror queue games
- A differential game related to terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg strategies
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44281 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- Analyzing bioterror; response logistics: The case of smallpox.
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
Cited in
(21)- Security protection design for deception and real system regimes: a model and analysis
- A review of attacker-defender games: current state and paths forward
- Location-allocation planning of stockpiles for effective disaster mitigation
- Optimal sensor deployment to increase the security of the maximal breach path in border surveillance
- Designing response supply chain against bioattacks
- The path of terror attacks
- Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?
- Maintaining effective logistics management during and after COVID-19 pandemic: survey on the importance of artificial intelligence to enhance recovery strategies
- Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game
- Sequential competitive location on networks
- Robust equilibria in location games
- Optimal response against bioterror attack on airport terminal
- Governments' and terrorists' defense and attack in a \(T\)-period game
- A game‐theoretic approach for the location of terror response facilities with both disruption risk and hidden information
- Incorporating the threat of terrorist attacks in the design of public service facility networks
- Modeling the logistics response to a bioterrorist anthrax attack
- Governments playing games and combating the dynamics of a terrorist organization
- Supply location and transportation planning for hurricanes: a two-stage stochastic programming framework
- Location of response facilities: a simultaneous game between state and terrorist
- Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations
- A new epidemics-logistics model: insights into controlling the Ebola virus disease in West Africa
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