When Hackers Err: The Impacts of False Positives on Information Security Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5118194
DOI10.1287/deca.2017.0363WikidataQ129798480 ScholiaQ129798480MaRDI QIDQ5118194
Publication date: 7 September 2020
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1065435/
spam; classification; false positive; honeypot; information security game; misestimation; Nigerian scam
91-XX: Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences
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