Historical evolution and benefit-cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision: an evolutionary game analysis framework
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.12.046zbMATH Open1346.91030OpenAlexW2000175378MaRDI QIDQ319258FDOQ319258
Authors: Dehai Liu, Xingzhi Xiao, Weiguo Wang, Hong-Yi Li
Publication date: 6 October 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.12.046
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evolutionary gameOR in societal problem analysiscoal mine accidentsgovernment safety supervisionperiodical fluctuation
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Cited In (10)
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- The evolutionary game analysis and simulation with system dynamics of manufacturer's emissions abatement behavior under cap-and-trade regulation
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- Approximate solutions for expanding search games on general networks
- Multiparty evolutionary game model in coal mine safety management and its application
- Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation
- Behavior choice of game parties under the interference of cognition in the game between coal miners and supervisors
- Evolutionary game research on symmetry of workers' behavior in coal mine enterprises
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