Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory

DOI10.1007/BF00934113MaRDI QIDQ754787zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors George P. Papavassilopoulos, Cruz, J. B. jun.

Publication date 1980

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934113

zbMATH Keywords

Nash differential gamesrecall of the previous trajectoryStackelberg differential gamesstrategies with memorysufficient conditions for optimal strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

Cites work

• An unsymmetric Fubini theorem
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems
• Control of Functional Differential Equations of Retarded and Neutral Type to Target Sets in Function Space
• Differential Games with Delay
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3116942 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3281211 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inverse Problem of Linear Optimal Control
• Leader-follower strategies for multilevel systems
• New results in the theory of differential games with information time lag
• Nonclassical control problems and Stackelberg games
• Nonzero-sum differential games
• On the existence of Nash strategies and solutions to coupled Riccati equations in linear-quadratic games
• Results in the theory of linear differential games with an information time lag
• Variational Problems Involving Functional Differential Equations

Cited in

(10)

• Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
• Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
• An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
• Equilibrium strategies in dynamic games with multi-levels of hierarchy
• A control-theoretic view on incentives
• Dynamic optimization and forward looking processes
• Linear feedback closed-loop Stackelberg strategies for descriptor systems with multilevel hierarchy
• Closed-loop strategies in continuous dynamic game with multi-level of hierarchy
• The maximum principle for global solutions of stochastic Stackelberg differential games
• Closed-loop equilibria for Stackelberg games: a story about stochastic targets

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