Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2004.10.014zbMATH Open1120.90356OpenAlexW2057928870MaRDI QIDQ2490171FDOQ2490171

Authors Chunhui Xu, Naoki Shiba, Kyoichi Kijima

Publication date 28 April 2006

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

StrategyIncentiveFalse representation preventionPenalty rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

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