Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2004.10.014zbMATH Open1120.90356OpenAlexW2057928870MaRDI QIDQ2490171FDOQ2490171

Authors: Chunhui Xu, Naoki Shiba, Kyoichi Kijima 

Publication date: 28 April 2006

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.10.014

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zbMATH Keywords

StrategyIncentiveFalse representation preventionPenalty rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems

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