A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:581198)
The class of interactive processes which unifies a large family of incentive-compatible, non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation algorithms is formalized. The equations of motion are defined by the linear combination of reported marginal profits. The conditions on the matrix of motion ensure convergence, feasibility and optimality of the process. The process can be made compatible and non-subsidizing by imposing an appropriate tax rate on each user.
Recommendations
- Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45646
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4174637
- On a kind of optimal resource allocation problem with application
- Efficient resource allocation with non-concave objective functions
- A Multiperiod Minimax Resource Allocation Problem with Substitutable Resources
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3763673
- The Fair Resource Allocation Problem with Submodular Constraints
- A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem
Cites work
- An incentive-compatible modification of the heal algorithm
- An incentive-compatible resource allocation problem allowing collusion
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3713496 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3718924 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive-compatible allocation algorithm for non-separable group payoffs
- Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm
- On incentive problems
- Planning without Prices
Cited in
(8)- Optimal allocation and backup of computer resources under asymmetric information and incentive incompatibility
- Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Incentive-compatible allocation algorithm for non-separable group payoffs
- An incentive-compatible resource allocation problem allowing collusion
- A hierarchical optimization model of resource allocation
- On misrepresentation-proof strategies in incentive design problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3993287 (Why is no real title available?)
This page was built for publication: A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q581198)