Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(81)90015-9zbMath0477.90095OpenAlexW2082940671MaRDI QIDQ1160575

Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(81)90015-9

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalperfect equilibriumone shot noncooperative gamespreplay negotiationsprisoners' dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (12)

Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism ⋮ Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies ⋮ Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design ⋮ The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally ⋮ Social systems analysis ⋮ Information leakage forces cooperation ⋮ Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma ⋮ A commitment folk theorem ⋮ Two-Player Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers ⋮ Far-sighted equilibria in 2\(\times 2\), non-cooperative, repeated games ⋮ Sequential auctions on Boehm-Bawerk's horse market ⋮ A dynamic solution in \(N\)-person cooperative game theory

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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