Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.05.008zbMATH Open1309.91027OpenAlexW3125877393MaRDI QIDQ406376FDOQ406376

Ju Hu

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/13-009.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learningrelative entropyrepeated gamesreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Elements of Information Theory
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• Reputation and exogenous private learning
• Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation

Cited In (2)

• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model

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