A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem
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Publication:2407882
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2017.02.004zbMath1425.91029OpenAlexW2591420928MaRDI QIDQ2407882
Filippo Bistaffa, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Alessandro Farinelli
Publication date: 6 October 2017
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/407399/1/2017aij.pdf
Related Items (2)
How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium ⋮ Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value
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Cites Work
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