A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
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Publication:843748
DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0094-7zbMATH Open1195.91073OpenAlexW2045914602MaRDI QIDQ843748FDOQ843748
Authors: P. Luquin, J. Arin, Elena Inarra 
Publication date: 15 January 2010
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0094-7
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
- A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- Egalitarian solutions in the core
Cited In (11)
- A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
- Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
- How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium
- A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
- On supremum-norm cost games
- A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cost allocation and airport problems
- The airport problem with capacity constraints
- A Nash equilibrium solution for the discrete two-person cost sharing problem
- Airport games: the core and its center
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