A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules

DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0094-7MaRDI QIDQ843748zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Luquin, J. Arin, Elena Inarra

Publication date 15 January 2010

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0094-7

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolusairport gamesegalitarian allocationNash outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

Cited in

(11)

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• How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium
• A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives
• On supremum-norm cost games
• A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4152104 (Why is no real title available?)
• The airport problem with capacity constraints
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• A Nash equilibrium solution for the discrete two-person cost sharing problem
• Airport games: the core and its center

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