The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1954379 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- A cost-sharing method for an economic lot-sizing game
- A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
- Beyond Moulin mechanisms
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
- Cost allocation for a spanning tree
- Cost-sharing mechanisms for network design
- Generalized Network Problems Yielding Totally Balanced Games
- Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
- On the Core of Cost Allocation Games Defined on Location Problems
- On the core of linear production games
- On the core of network synthesis games
- Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Structure preserving reductions among convex optimization problems
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The equal split-off set for cooperative games
- Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
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