Sharing rewards among strangers based on peer evaluations
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Publication:2963448
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5017566 (Why is no real title available?)
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- An anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation
- Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
- Beyond nash equilibrium
- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
- Impartial division of a dollar
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Multiagent Systems
- Network optimization models for resource allocation in developing military countermeasures
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation
- The bargaining problem
- Three-agent peer evaluation
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