Sharing rewards among strangers based on peer evaluations
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Publication:2963448
DOI10.1287/DECA.1120.0247zbMATH Open1355.91022OpenAlexW2166193748MaRDI QIDQ2963448FDOQ2963448
Authors: Arthur Carvalho, K. Larson 
Publication date: 14 February 2017
Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e230480581cca5fa416108ac7816bf8e6a114efe
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Cites Work
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- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- The bargaining problem
- Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
- Multiagent Systems
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
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- Impartial division of a dollar
- Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
- An anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation
- Beyond nash equilibrium
- Three-agent peer evaluation
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- Network optimization models for resource allocation in developing military countermeasures
Cited In (4)
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