Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
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Publication:656802
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0523-0zbMATH Open1278.91083OpenAlexW2149219979MaRDI QIDQ656802FDOQ656802
Publication date: 13 January 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0523-0
Recommendations
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
- Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
- Egalitarian allocations and convexity
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Constrained egalitarian allocations
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods with minimum inequality or minimum envy
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Fair imposition
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
Cited In (17)
- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- No-envy in the Queueing Problem with Multiple Identical Machines
- Ordinal allocation
- No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- Non-bossiness
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
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